Question One. Whether it is Possible for Christ’s Body to be Contained Really under the Species of Bread and Wine

8. To proceed thus to the first question, arguments are made that this is not possible:

Because the body of Christ is not contained under the species of unconsecrated bread; therefore not after consecration either. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence is that a species after the consecration is not disposed differently in itself than it was before.

9. And if you say that before consecration a species is in a subject and afterwards without a subject, then I take the proposition that it is not disposed differently in relation to the body of Christ after the consecration, when it is without a subject, than it was before the consecration, when it was in a subject. For its being in a subject in no way varies this relation. But the species of bread is of this sort whether in a subject or not; therefore its relation to the body of Christ is not changed by its being or not being in a subject. But it is impossible for something to be where it was not before, unless either it or what it is in is newly changed. Therefore since the species of bread are not changed in relation to the body of Christ after consecration, the consequence is that the body of Christ must be changed in relation to the species in order for it to be newly there. But this is false, because the body of Christ remains unchangeably in heaven, according to

Augustine On John’s Gospel tr.30 n.1 (and in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.44): “The Lord is above until the end of the age.”

10. Again second, as follows: Christ’s body under the species is either a definite quantity, a quantum, or not a quantum, because a quantity cannot be separated from the mode of the quantity (just as neither can a subject be separated from its specific property), because the specific property of quantity seems to be most of the all the mode of the quantity. Therefore Christ’s body would exist in a mode of quantity. But this is false because the less cannot exist together with the greater in this way.The mode of quantity seems to be its determinate amount, and clearly the quantity of Christ’s body is greater in amount (in size, weight etc.) than the quantity of the consecrated host. ³

11. Again third, as follows, that in the Eucharist Christ’s body has part next to part or not. If it does, then not all the parts of Christ’s body would be together under the same part of the consecrated host; and universally, if something whose parts are part next to part is under some quantum, one part is with one part of that quantum and the whole of it with the whole of it. But if part is not next to part in it, then there is no quantum there; whence the definition of a continuous quantum is that it be part next to part.

12. On the contrary:

In Matthew 26.26 Christ says, “This is my body,” and John 6.56, “my flesh is food indeed.”

13. And many authorities from Augustine and Ambrose are set down in the Master’s text [IV d.10 ch.1 n.6-ch.2 n.7, also in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.55.

I. To the Question

14. Here two things must be explained, as is the case about other matters of belief: first what is to be maintained and by what authority; second how what is believed is possible [cf. Scotus, On the First Principle ch.3 n.1].

A. What is to be Maintained and by What Authority

15. On the first point I say that the proposition ‘the body of Christ is of a truth really there’ belongs simply to the articles of faith, in the way that the truth of any sacrament belongs to the articles of faith. For this truth was handed on expressly from the beginning, from when the Eucharist was instituted.

16. The foundation of this authority is Matthew 26.26-28 and Luke 22.19-20, where in the Cena Christ says, “This is my body; this is my blood.”

17. And if heretics [e,g, Berengar of Tours, who afterwards recanted] want to gloss this by saying that it is said figuratively, like what is said in John 15.1, “I am the true vine,” and in I Corinthians 10.4, “Now that rock was Christ” - this is altogether against the intention of the Savior.

18. The fact is plain from a saying of Augustine 83 Questions q.69 n.2, “The circumstances of Scripture show how to understand Scripture.” For universally the meaning of the words of Christ (whether he is speaking figuratively or not) can be gathered from what precedes and what follows in the same place, or from other places of Scripture. Hence when Christ say, “I am the true vine,” he adds, “and you are the branches;” for it is plain that the disciples were not natural branches but only branches figuratively.

19. But when he says in Luke 22, “This is my body,” he adds, “which will be given up for you;” also when he had said, “This is the chalice of my blood,” he adds in the same place, “which will be shed for you.” The same is also plain from another place of Scripture, namely John 6, where there is an extended sermon about this sacrament.

20. And if you say that, when Christ saw that some departed from him because of his preaching about the Eucharist, he then gave an exposition of himself saying, “The spirit gives life but the flesh is worth nothing at all; the words that I speak to you are spirit and they are life,” which Augustine treats of (On the Psalms psalm 98 n.9; in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.44), and says, “Not this body which you see will you eat of, nor the blood that they will shed     etc .” “It is a sacrament I have commended to you; spiritually understood will it give you life.” Therefore      it seems from the words of Christ and Augustine that he does not understand them of the body save figuratively -

21. I say that the Master replies in the text, and replies well, that neither Christ nor Augustine in their exposition mean to deny the truth of Christ’s body in the sacrament, but that Christ’s body is not in the sacrament carnally, as those took it who departed from him, namely as visible in its proper form. Rather, in opposition to this way of understanding, it is there spiritually, that is intelligibly. And this is what Augustine says (and the Master adduces it, from Gratian ibid. ch.45), “It indeed is eaten, and not the body that was seen - it invisibly, not visibly.”The words are not from Augustine in fact but Lanfranc On the Body and Blood of the Lord ch.18, and from Ambrose’s Letter to Irenaeus 64 n.1. The misattributions are found first in Gratian, from whom the Master took them, and Scotus from the Master. Vatican editors. ⁴

22. In this way too does the Apostle treat at length of the Eucharist I Corinthians 11.23-29, and all later Catholics who expound these places of Scripture and say that the words of Scripture are to be understood of the real and not figurative presence of the body of Christ.

23. Hence it is a straightforward heresy today to think that the true body is not really there.

This on the first point [n.14].

B. How What is Believed is Possible

1. Four Possibilities, to be Explained in Turn in what Follows

24. On the second point [n.14] many impossibilities seem to be involved here, namely, following the principles of the philosophers: i) one is that a quantum exists together in a quantum, or that the substance of Christ’s body is here without its quantity; ii) a second is that a greater quantum exists together in a small quantum, namely in the same space as it; iii) a third is that the body of Christ begins to exist here, and yet without motion or change properly speaking, because it is not posited as leaving its ‘where’ in heaven; iv) a fourth is that a quantum exists really at once in diverse places.

25. Now the possibility of all these things is not to be explained here, because the prolixity would be too much.

For that i) the substance is not here without its quantity will be stated in the second part of this distinction 10, in question 1 nn.260-263.

26. But as to how ii) a quantum can exist together in a quantum, the difficulty is more evident about quanta that possess quantitative mode than when one or both are without quantitative mode. Therefore, this difficulty will be touched on in the material about glorious bodies, in the questions about the subtlety of the glorious body [IV d.49 p.2 suppl. q.7].

27. The final one, iii) and iv), that one quantum exists at the same time in several places, will be explained in the two questions that follow.

2. Two Possibilities to be Explained here

28. For this question, then, two things remain to be explained, namely how it is possible for the body of Christ to begin to exist on the altar without its moving in place iii), and how it is possible for Christ’s body to be a quantum without quantitative mode ii).

a. First: About Christ’s Body Beginning to Exist on the Altar without Change of Place

α. Opinion of Others and its Rejection

29. About the first it is commonly said [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, William of Auxerre] that this is because of the change of something else into the body of Christ (namely because of the conversion of bread into the body of Christ), and so it is not necessary for Christ’s body to change in itself. For it is enough that something change into it for this sort of body to begin to be present there. Because just as a thing is generated where first something was corrupted, and not through a change proper to the generated thing, so does it seem that that into which something is converted by conversion of something else into it occurs where the thing converted into it first was, and not by a change in place proper to the term ‘to which’ of the conversion, but proper to the term ‘from which’.

30. On the contrary: I suppose that, according to them, transubstantiation, in the way it is admitted to be a change, is a substantial change. From this it follows that the change has some substance as the per se term ‘to which’. But by no change is that per se obtained which is posterior to its per se term. But this sort of presence [sc. of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is posterior simply to the substance of the body of Christ; and this substance, it is manifest, is the term of the change. For this sort of presence is not essentially prior to it (because the substance of the body can be without this sort of presence), nor is it simultaneous in nature with it (because then its presence could only be destroyed if the substance was destroyed, which is false).

31. This reasoning can be confirmed in another way, by putting otherness for posteriority as follows: By no change is that per se obtained which is per se other than its per se term; but the sort of presence in question here is simply other than the substance that is the per se term of transubstantiation;     therefore etc     .

32. The major is plain, because to one per se change there is one per se term, and so whatever is per se other than the term, although it is per accidens the same as it, is not per se obtained through that change.

33. The minor is plain, because the sort of presence in question here is not the substance of bread, because there is no bread then; nor is it the substance of the body of Christ, because that substance was when this presence was not.

34. A second argument [sc. to the contrary. n.30] is as follows: God can make his body present to any bread while the substance of the bread remains, and yet this will not be by a change that is change to substance as to the per se term, because no substance of the bread is new, and yet thereby is obtained a presence of the same idea as the presence which is obtained now; therefore it must be by a change of the same idea; therefore it would be by a change other than substantial change.

35. The proof of the major [n.34] is that newness of what is prior does not follow on newness of what is posterior. The fact is plain from Physics 8.8.264b9-265a12 where the Philosopher maintains that in a circle there can be motion as to ‘where’ although there cannot be any newness in it as to absolute form. Hence something can be moved as to place without change as to substance (the reason is that ‘where’ is a certain extrinsic relation coming to a thing and not an absolute form). But the presence [of Christ’s body] here is posterior to the substance of the bread, just as relation is posterior to what is absolute, and posterior above all to substance. Therefore there can, without any change in the substance of the bread, be a new presence of [Christ’s] body to the bread. So there must be some change toward this sort of presence, a change that is not a substantial one. And consequently, in the matter at hand, this presence is not obtained through transubstantiation in substance, because a term of the same idea (and presence is a term of this sort) is not properly and per se the term of two changes distinct in genus.

36. And if you say that it can become present to the substance of the bread without substantial change, but yet it does become present through a substantial change of the bread into the body of Christ, and not through another change - on the contrary, God could convert the bread into the body of Christ previously made present to the bread. For there is no greater contradiction in this than there is now when the bread is converted into Christ’s non-previously present body. Therefore, if the sort of conversion of the bread done now is done into the body of Christ already present to the species of bread, the body would not come to be present there again. Or one would have to say that it became present after it was present and that the same presence would be the term of both the stated changes [sc. the change of bread to Christ’s body already present to the bread, and the change of bread to Christ’s body not already present to the bread];     therefore etc     .

37. Third [to the contrary] as follows: what is converted into something preexistent acquires the properties of that something pre-existent rather than the reverse. The point is plain, for if nutriment is converted into flesh, it is animated rather by the soul of the flesh than the flesh informed by the form of the nutriment and, universally, the nutriment acquires the absolute conditions and the ‘where’ and the other respects of the flesh rather than the reverse. Therefore, by the mere conversion of bread into the preexisting body of Christ the converted bread would acquire presence in heaven rather the body of Christ acquire the presence of the species of bread on the altar.

38. Fourth as follows: God could convert the bread into the body of Christ as Christ’s body has being in heaven, because there is no greater contradiction in this case than in the conversion that is posited now. But by such conversion Christ’s body would not then be possessed under the species of bread on the altar; therefore not now either.

39. Fifth as follows: if the bread quantum is converted into Christ’s body quantum, so that quantity is converted into quantity and substance into substance, Christ’s body quantum would not be circumscribed by the ‘where’ that the bread was circumscribed by; therefore by the conversion of substance into substance, the substance of Christ’s body does not have the definite ‘where’ which was the definite ‘where’ of the substance of bread.

40. The antecedent is manifest, because that quantum, namely Christ’s body, could not be circumscribed by the place of the bread, since it is larger than the bread.

41. The proof of the consequence is that just as a substance and a substance (which exist under quantity) are related to definite place, so also is a substance quantum related to a substance quantum as to circumscribed place; therefore that which conversion into a substance makes to be in a definite place, this the conversion of a substance quantum into a substance quantum would make to be in a circumscribed place.

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

42. As to this article, then [n.28], it does not seem one must necessarily take flight to the conversion of the bread into the body, especially since from the beginning, from when there is a thing of this sacrament, it was always believed that the body of Christ does not move from its place in heaven in order to be here, and yet there was not from the beginning as clear a belief about the conversion, as will be said in d.11 nn.105-106.

43. [Certain preliminaries] - I speak to this point, then, by laying down certain preliminaries, namely that when a body moves from place to place and expels another body, there are commonly four motions or changes in it and eight terms: namely two changes in the expelling body and two in the expelled body.

44. For the expelling body is moved from its first ‘where’ to the privation of this ‘where’, and this change between the positive term ‘from which’ to the privative term ‘to which’ can be called a losing of the first ‘where’; the same body too, from its lack of the second ‘where’, is moved to the second ‘where’, and so the change from the privation, as from the term ‘from which’ to the ‘where’ as to the term ‘to which’, can be called the acquisition of a ‘where’.

45. Similarly there are two changes and four terms concerning the body that is expelled when the first body enters its place.

46. But if a body were moved and another body not expelled from its place, there would now only be two changes, and both in the moved body: one namely that is loss of its first ‘where’ and the other its acquisition of a new ‘where’.

But if the body, by not leaving its first ‘where’, were to be now in a new ‘where’, only one change would be in it, namely from its not having the new ‘where’ to its having that new ‘where’; and this would be a change in acquisition. And there would be no change of a losing (which would be from the first ‘where’ to the lack of it), because ex hypothesi the first ‘where’ is not lost, though the body be placed in a new ‘where’.

47. But if none of these changes is posited, it would be altogether unintelligible how the body would be where it was not before. For it is impossible for what was previously not really here to be in any way here without there being some real change in it, or in that to which it is really present; for in no way is there a passage, as to any real predicate, from contradictory to contradictory [sc. from not here to here] without there being some real change; nor is there a reason why this part of the contradiction [sc. here] is more real now than it was before, nor why another [sc. not here] is more true than this one, and so both now and before either both are simultaneously true or both are simultaneously false.

48. [Application of the preliminaries to the matter at issue] - To the matter at issue: that there is a losing in the body of Christ of its ‘where’ in heaven is posited by no one, according to Augustine above, “The Lord is above until the end of the age” [n.9] -and understanding by this, ‘unless it pleased him, by some special grace, to make a local descent’, which is not posited as happening because of the truth of the Eucharist.

49. However, in order to save the real presence of Christ’s body here on the altar, one must posit that there is some presence of it to the species of bread that there was not before, otherwise it would not be more present now than not present. For the change that concerns the species, namely that they were first in a subject and now without a subject, does nothing for the fact that Christ’s body becomes present to them from not being present to them (as was proved above [nn.30-41]); for that presence has per se terms other than this change to make its non-presence become presence. Therefore, one must posit some per se change in Christ’s body that makes for acquisition of this new presence.

50. But this change cannot properly be called change in place, for two reasons. First, because no loss of the prior ‘where’ accompanies this change, as it commonly does in change of place; for one can identify in it, namely in change of place, a positive term ‘from which’ and a positive term ‘to which’, and these accompany two privations, in the way the Philosopher says in Physics 5.1.225a7-10, that “movement is from non-subject to subject.” Second, nor is there properly here a ‘where’ term of the change, because Christ’s body at the term of this sort of change does not properly have here a ‘where’, nor a being circumscribed by something, but its term is a certain simple presence to the species, though a true and real presence.

51. And if you ask ‘to what category does this change and term of change belong?’ - I say that if an angel be placed newly present to a body, that angel is said indeed to be in a definite place, in the way in which it belongs to an angel to be in place [Ord. II d.2 nn.249-251; also below nn.117-118, 146]. And thus is the angel said to change, although the change is very far from a true change in ‘where’.

52. Further, as to the other conditions, this presence of the body of Christ departs more from the true idea of ‘where’ than the existence of an angel in place does, because in no way is Christ’s body by this presence so determined to a single ‘where’ that another ‘where’ is repugnant to it. But an angel is by its ‘where’ so determined to that ‘where’ that another ‘where’ is repugnant to it.

53. And if you hold it unacceptable to say that there is any change of any kind in the real being of Christ’s body, I say that it is necessary at least to posit some respect coming to that body from outside, which does not follow necessarily on the foundation and term when these are posited in act, because every respect that follows in this way comes to a thing from within (as was shown in the question about character [IV d.6 n.295]). Therefore the respect can come to it newly from outside without anything new either in the foundation or the term.

54. So, therefore, it is not unacceptable that the body of Christ is newly present to something that does not have a new absolute form nor a new respect in respect of that body; or if it does have such a new respect then, by parity of reasoning, the body of

Christ too will have a new respect to it, because if the species are newly present to the body, then the body is newly present to them; for although containment is not a mutual real relation, yet presence is a mutual relation. Nor will it in that case be unacceptable to posit in Christ’s body this sort of change to a respect coming to it from outside.

55. And if you object that ‘there is no change that is change to a respect’ - the solution is in the question about ‘character’ [n.53, ibid.].

And if your whole complaint is, ‘this respect that comes from without, which is called simple presence, what category does it belong to?’ - one can say that, among all the respects that come from without, it is more properly reduced to the category ‘where’, because it agrees with that respect in many ways. And if perhaps it is not properly in that category, it follows that the ten categories do not sufficiently exhaust the whole of being; which is not unacceptable in the way the philosophers speak about the ideas of them; because it is not repugnant to find some respect (as of an angel to a stone) which does not have any idea of respect in a category the way the philosophers say. Nor yet does it follow from this that there are more categories than ten, but that the ideas of them, or of one of them, is not assigned under an idea as common, or is not as general, as could be assigned.

b. Second: About Christ’s Body Quantum without Quantitative Mode

α. First Opinion and its Rejection

56. On the second point it is said [Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome et al.] that the quantity of Christ’s body is not under the species of bread save concomitantly, because the first term of the conversion is the substance of the body of Christ, and a thing is there in the way in which it is the term of the conversion. Therefore the quantity is not there by way of being the first term. But the first term, which is the substance, does not of itself have a quantitative or commensurate mode; therefore the quantity existing there under the idea or the mode of it, that is of the substance, will be there in non-quantitative mode.

57. On the contrary: each thing, whether it is the first term of the transubstantiation or the second, provided however it is there, has the properties that necessarily or naturally belong to it.

There is proof also of this through an example, because if God were to create a substance quantum or if nature were to generate a substance and quantity were a concomitant, the first term of each production will be the substance and the quantity will be concomitant; and yet both in the generated and the created thing the quantity has its real mode, just as it would also have if it were the first term of a change.

58. This is also proved by reason:

Because a different relation to the agent does not vary the nature of the thing, whether the relation is first or second, mediate or immediate, provided however that the thing is produced; because neither does a relation to a different agent vary the nature of the thing done, according to Augustine On the Trinity 3.9 n.16. Therefore neither will quantity lack its natural mode merely for the reason that it is not the first term of transubstantiation, provided it is really there (whether primarily or secondarily) through the change.

Secondly as follows: if, through the conversion, the term ‘to which’ is where the term ‘from which’ was before, the mode of being of the latter and the former will be similar, at least the mode of being that can be common to both. But the converted bread was here quantitatively in its own way, because it was under quantity having part next to part. Therefore the substance of Christ’s body as well, existing here by force of the conversion, will be here quantitatively in its own way, namely having part of substance under part of quantity; and then quantity will be here in its proper dimensions.

β. Second Opinion and its Rejection

59. Alternatively it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines, Albert the Great] that the parts of Christ’s body are next to each other in the sacramental host.

The proof is as follows, that just as it is possible for divine virtue that a body be simultaneously together with a body such that one part of the body exist simultaneously together with another part, so can divine virtue make part interpenetrate part, and so on and so on, making the part that has interpenetrated another again interpenetrate another, and in this way they will interpenetrate each other mutually up to the smallest natural quantity. Thus the true reality of each part is preserved and yet there is no extension of part next to part (just as the true reality of one body is preserved notwithstanding that it exists by interpenetration with another).

60. On the contrary: for this view takes from the body of Christ its position in the whole, as well as all shape that is perhaps necessary for an animated body. For if the head is not distant from the foot and the whole interpenetrates the whole up to the smallest natural part, there will no longer be the ordering of parts in the whole, nor the shape, that is necessary for an animated body.

γ. Scotus’ own Opinion

61. I say otherwise, then, that the position that is a difference of quantity is necessarily present in a permanent continuous quantum; and one must preserve it in the matter at hand, namely that it states the order of parts in the whole. For that something is a quantum with dimensions, and yet that this does not signify an order in the whole of this part to another part according to intervening quantity, is not very intelligible.

62. But the sense of position that is set down by some as a category, adds something else. For, on the presupposition that there is an order of parts in the whole, position states further an order of parts to place or to the parts of place or of what locates it in place; that is to say, that the parts are coextended with the parts of the place (as a ‘whole’ is said to be primarily commensurate with the whole place in which it has its ‘where’), so that position as a category presupposes position as difference of quantity, and it specifies the ‘where’.

Now by quantitative or dimensioned mode (however it is named) I understand only position said in the second way [sc. ‘where’].

63. But this relation can be separated by God from a quantum (while position in the first sense remains), and not merely by negation of limit, just as he could make a body outside the universe. And then it would not have position in the second sense [sc. ‘where’], because it would not have anything containing it with whose parts the parts of the contained thing were commensurated. But even when a limit has been posited, namely a limit with whose presence there could be commensuration or coextension with another body, God could preserve a quantum and its coexistence with another quantum and yet without a coextension of the parts of one quantum with the parts of the other, which coextension is what is meant by position in the sense we are speaking of [sc. ‘where’].

64. I prove this in a first way as follows: any nature that has a contingent relation to some form of some genus is simply related contingently to the whole genus (by ‘simply’ I mean ‘not necessarily from an intrinsic cause’). This seems sufficiently evident in that, if there were some nature and if it were from some intrinsic cause that necessarily determined a genus for it, it would necessarily determine some species of that genus for it. For one nature does not intrinsically have a necessity for disjunct opposites without having a necessity for one of those opposites.

65. And hereby is solved an objection that could be made: number is necessarily equal or unequal, but it is not necessarily one rather than the other. For the objection is about some common respect of a property that has distinctions, but any specific instance is necessarily related to one of the two as also to the genus.The objection seems to be that if number is necessarily equal or unequal, then it is necessarily equal or necessarily unequal. But the necessity refers to the disjunction (which is common to both), namely ‘number is necessarily one or the other’, and not to the disjuncts (which are distinct for each), namely ‘number is necessarily this one’, or ‘number is necessarily that one’. Of course, any particular number, as opposed to number as a class, will necessarily be the equal it is or necessarily the unequal it is. ⁵ Nor is there even an objection to the matter at hand, because there is no subject here that is contingently disposed to some form of the whole genus.The subject is a quantum that coexists with another quantum, but which God withholds from having coextension with it, and so place [n.63]. Such a quantum, then, has no ‘where’ and is not disposed, even contingently, to having this ‘where’ or that ‘where’ or some other ‘where’. ⁶

66. And if you object that a surface is necessarily colored and yet it is contingently related to any particular color - this is not an objection, because here there is no necessity intrinsically; for one could not find an intrinsic idea whereby there would be a contradiction on the part of a surface that it was without color, as there is contingency in respect of any particular color.The objection seems to be that just as a surface is necessarily colored but not necessarily this color rather than that color, so a quantum is necessarily in a place but not necessarily in this place rather than that place. The response is to deny the analogy by denying that a surface qua surface is necessarily colored (there is no necessity intrinsically, or no necessity in surface as such). For color is not surface but the limit of the transparent at a surface, and a surface would have no such limit in the dark (when there is no transparency for it to be a limit to), nor would it if the surface were transparent (like glass) and so were not a limit to whatever transparent medium there was. So similarly a quantum has no necessity in itself to be in a place. The objection fails, therefore, because it does not hold of a quantum simply, as it does not hold of surface simply, but only of a quantum together with the additional relation of place and only of surface with the additional property of being the limit of the transparent. ⁷

Taking this major, then [n.64], I add the minor, namely that a body is related contingently to any position (this is plain, because I can move my body from any position to another). Therefore a body, even when it has the position of parts in the whole, is not simply related necessarily to the position that is a category [sc. ‘where’], nor is the coexistence of a quantum with a quantum simply a necessary reason for position in that sense; for it is possible to understand coexistence of something with the whole without understanding the coexistence or coextension of parts with parts. For this latter coexistence is different from the former, even when they go together, nor does the former include the latter in its formal idea. Therefore, a body quantum absolutely, possessing the first sense of position [n.61], could be without all extrinsic position or idea, that is, it could be understood to be a quantum and to have coexistence with another quantum without this sort of position [sc. ‘where’].

67. And if you ask what this means, namely ‘preserving quantity without extrinsic position’ [sc. ‘where’] - I say that it means nothing other than conserving an absolute without the respect that comes to it from outside. In this way too, preserving the coexistence without that [extrinsic] position is nothing other than to conserve one relation without a different extrinsic relation - as the relation that is position ‘where’ is the relation of the whole circumscribed thing to the whole circumscribing thing. But position in the sense stated, which is a different genus [the genus of position in the sense of relation of parts with each other without extrinsic relation to a circumscribing body], adds the respect of parts to parts. And that the first necessarily has the second is only because its respect is such that it includes the diversity of the parts and the presence of them to the parts of what locates them. But the coexistence of some whole with the whole or with any part abstracts from position in this sense, the sense in which ‘where’ necessarily has position. Therefore it is simply possible for this coexistence to be without position [sc. without ‘where’].

68. And this can be well explained briefly as follows, that the second sense of position presupposes ‘where’ strictly speaking; therefore if God can conserve a quantum without a ‘where’ properly speaking, he can also conserve it without position.

69. And if you say “it can well be without a ‘where’ but not when it has presence or coexistence with another body” - this is false, for although coexistence is of a quantum with a body, it is however not formally a ‘where’.

70. And if it be objected that quantity cannot be posited without the respect that quantitative mode states, because there cannot be a quantum and another quantum unless the one be commensurated with the other - I say that equality and inequality, which state a respect coming from within, do indeed follow on quantity when quantity is posited. But an extrinsic respect does not necessarily follow, and of such sort is commensuration, or more properly coextension, as we are here speaking of it [sc. ‘where’]. For if you speak of commensuration as to equality and inequality, namely that this is bigger or smaller than that, I concede that, in the matter at hand, Christ’s body is bigger than the sacramental host. But this commensuration is not what is properly called ‘coextension’, for this properly states the being together of part with part [sc. ‘where’].

II. To the Initial Reasons

71. Herefrom is plain the solution to the initial reasons.

To the first [n.8] the answer is plain from the first article [nn.15-16, 21-23], because I concede that here there is not only a change of the species, whereby they come to be without a subject from being in a subject, but also another change, whereby they come to be present to the body of Christ. And together with this I concede a new presence of the body of Christ to the species; and there is change toward this presence, and the change must be judged to be of the sort that the form is.

Or if use of the word ‘change’ does not please, let it be said that some new extrinsic respect coming from outside is without all change; nor will ‘to change’ then be ‘to go from one to the other’ the way Gregory says in Moralia V ch.38 n.68; nor will change be for the same thing to be somehow or other differently disposed in itself to something else, but only to be differently disposed in itself to itself, or to another, from a relation coming to its foundation extrinsically. But the relation will not then be a change, because nothing new comes to it, from Physics 7.3.246b24-27.

72. To the second [n.10] I say that quantitative mode is not a property of a quantum (as ability to laugh is a property of man); rather it is an accident per accidens of it, namely a respect, coming from outside, of parts of a quantum to parts of another quantum.

73. To the third [n.11] I concede that part is next to part, insofar as the ‘next to’ has regard to the per se parts of the body and is required for position in the sense of a difference of quantity. But insofar as ‘next to’ belongs to place, part is not next to part in this sense, that is, not next to the place where another part is. Nor does it follow from this that the whole is not a quantum, because a whole quantum, having its parts next to each other in the same way in the whole, can have a single presence of itself and of all its parts to some single thing next to it that is indivisible, or divisible as little as possible, such that there is not there one presence to one part and another presence to another part to which a part is present.